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Abstract
This paper investigates the role of state capacity for political violence. Most previous studies have
suffered from inadequacies of country-level data, questionable validity of indicators or theoretical
shortcomings. This paper aims at overcoming some of these challenges. We focus on one specific
aspect of state capacity: the role of governmental manpower. We argue that its subnational effect
on political violence follows a non-linear, inverted-U shape. We investigate this hypothesis in the
context of southern Sudan, covering the period from 2006 to 2010. We use unique data on the
geographical distribution of public personnel across 75 southern Sudanese counties. The data are
matched with geocoded data on violent events as well as various socio-economic indicators. Our
fixed-effects estimations indicate that particularly low or high levels of state capacity are associ-
ated with low levels of violence. Counties with intermediate numbers of state personnel experi-
ence the highest numbers of violent events.
Keywords
Political violence, South Sudan, state capacity
Introduction
State capacity matters for political violence.1 States that are not capable of fulfilling their
security mandate may provide opportunities for rebellion, making anti-state action less costly
and more promising. Similarly, states that are not able to provide effective public goods
delivery may foment grievances that increase the risk of violence (e.g. Fjelde and De Soysa,
2009; Schwarz, 2005).
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Whereas theoretical arguments on the role of the state and its capacity for political vio-
lence are quite straightforward, their empirical investigation is not. Most studies that ana-
lyze the role of state capacity for violence rely on cross-national data. A recently growing
body of research on the micro-dynamics of violence has, however, stressed that such analy-
ses are problematic in various respects, most notably owing to inferential problems that
emanate from national-level explanations of subnational phenomena (Buhaug and Rød,
2006; Gleditsch and Weidmann, 2012; Kalyvas, 2008).
Few subnational studies consider or actively investigate the role of state capacity
(Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug and Gates, 2002). Those studies that do have two central short-
comings: first, they struggle with challenges of conceptualization and operationalization
similar to their cross-country predecessors—they try to capture state capacity in general
terms, do not differentiate between various dimensions of the concept and often make use
of indicators with questionable validity; second, arguments about state capacity are often
adopted directly from cross-national studies. However, the subnational level differs from
the cross-national level in important respects. Notably, whereas from a country-level per-
spective many states may be considered weak in the aggregate, on the subnational level
the state may actually be strong in some, but wholly absent in other regions. These differ-
ences need to be considered in the development of hypotheses as well as in empirical
analyses.
Our paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the role of state capacity for
political violence. We argue the subnational effect of state capacity on political violence is
not simply linear, but rather follows an inverted-U shape. At very low levels of state capac-
ity little fighting takes place because rebel groups have no opportunity to target state institu-
tions, the value of state resources is low and inter-communal conflicts are regulated by local
informal institutions. At high levels of state capacity pacifying effects are realized, because
the government is able to effectively co-opt or coerce groups violating local peace. The state
is unable to effectively enforce the monopoly of violence at intermediate levels of state
capacity, governmental programs are likely to incite struggles over access to government ser-
vices, and a mismatch between informal local institutions and the claims of the state overall
increases levels of political violence.
We perform a subnational analysis of southern Sudan in the period ranging from 2006
and 2010 to test our argument. We make use of data from an administrative census underta-
ken in southern Sudan after the end of the civil war in 2005. The data provide geographi-
cally disaggregated numbers of all state personnel in functional areas such as healthcare,
education and security. They constitute a persuasive indicator for a specific dimension of
state capacity: manpower. Thus, we aim at capturing one crucial element of state capacity,
distinct from infrastructural or monetary resources. We match this data with geo-coded vio-
lent event data as well as socio-economic indicators on the county level. Our empirical find-
ings provide overall support for an inverted U-shaped effect on violence, with the evidence
being particularly strong for the conflict increasing effects of initial gains in state capacity.
Overall, our paper makes several relevant contributions to the existing literature: we
extend arguments about the role of state capacity for local violence; we use new data on the
manpower dimension of state capacity to test our hypothesis in a relevant country context;
and our results cast new light on the state capacity debate, highlighting the conflictual nature
of state building, as well as suggesting a greater need for better data and further conceptual
disaggregation. Finally, our paper also offers new empirical analysis of conflict patterns in
southern Sudan, contributing to a small but growing literature.
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The paper is structured as follows: we first briefly introduce previous studies on the role
of state capacity and political violence and outline some methodological and theoretical
shortcomings. The subsequent section presents our own approach followed by a brief intro-
duction of our empirical case. The next section describes the design, data and results of our
analysis. The final section summarizes our main arguments and findings.
State capacity and political violence
From a functional perspective two broad areas of state capacity may be distinguished and
considered particularly relevant for the risk of political violence: security and welfare.2 The
first refers to the ability of the state to uphold its monopoly over the legitimate use of force.
The welfare function of the state entails the provision of the necessary framework for eco-
nomic interaction as well as sponsoring of intra-societal economic redistribution (Boulding,
1989; Czempiel, 1981; Milliken and Krause, 2002).
Focusing on the opportunity or feasibility of rebellion, it has been argued that the
state’s capacity to deter violence matters. The basic argument is that people will refrain
from challenging states that have a strong military apparatus at their disposal. Country-
level analyses on the link between military power and violent conflict onset have been
inconclusive—whereas some studies confirm the role of coercive power others refute its
relevance (Bussmann, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fjelde
and De Soysa, 2009; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Henderson and Singer, 2000).
Subnational geospatial analyses have argued that violence will most likely occur in areas
where the state is not present or not able to effectively exert authority. For example,
Buhaug (2010) finds that, in comparably strong states, violence will occur in the periph-
eries rather than close to the capital. More generally Buhaug and Rød (2006) find that
subnational regions’ distance from the country capital has a positive effect on the likeli-
hood of violent conflict in these regions.
Emphasizing the role of grievances rather than opportunities, other studies have focused
on the ability of the state to co-opt rather than to coerce. Notably, Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003) argue that public spending can be used to ‘‘buy’’ the allegiance of broader segments
of the population and thus reduce the risk that the people will support challengers of state
authority. Taydas and Peksen (2012) as well as Fjelde and de De Soysa (2009) find a signifi-
cant negative connection between welfare spending and civil conflict. However, performing
analyses along the same lines and considering different types of violence, Bussmann (2009)
and Bethke and Bussmann (2011) cannot provide support for the thesis. Finally, Thyne
(2006) examines the role of educational expenditures, enrolment levels, and literacy rates for
civil war onset. He finds substantial pacifying effects of expenditures.
We argue that challenges in three areas have played major roles for this inconclusiveness.
They will be briefly sketched in the following three sections before we present our own
approach and theoretical argument.
Level of analysis
Countries still constitute the prime unit of analysis in peace and conflict studies. When it
comes to state capacity, we argue that such an approach is problematic in two respects: mea-
surement of state capacity on the national level may come with negligence of regional dispa-
rities and of differences between input and output.
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State capacity is influenced by geography. National-level numbers may obscure the strong
concentration of state capacity in specific regions. Quality and quantity of state repression or
provision of public goods may vary across subnational regions. Furthermore, the state might
be inclined to provide services differently across different regions and groups (Azam, 2001).
Thus, for example, high or low total welfare spending might be concentrated in specific
regions thus sharpening regional, ethnic or religious cleavages and increasing rather than
reducing the risk of violence. National level indicators of state capacity obscure such geogra-
phical variation, making it difficult to draw reliable inferences on the actual effects of state
capacity on substate violence (e.g. Raleigh et al., 2010; Raleigh, 2011).
Using macro-level (e.g. state-level) indicators to explain political violence requires auxili-
ary assumptions that link the indicator to local, micro-level dynamics. These assumptions
may introduce additional uncertainties into empirical analyses. Thus, for example, one has
to assume that national-level military or welfare spending mirrors actual state capacity on
the ground. However, inefficiency, inability or corruption may prevent expenditures on pub-
lic basic services or on military personnel from actually reaching the ground (Fjelde and De
Soysa, 2009). Thus, information on state planning, budget allocation and spending may say
little about the actual capacity to deliver in various subnational regions.
Conceptualization and operationalization
National and subnational studies alike have been struggling with identifying persuasive indi-
cators for state capacity. Such different indicators as regime type (Hegre, 2001), gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita (Fearon and Laitin, 2003) and extractive capacities (Bethke
and Bussmann, 2011; Englehart, 2009) have been used on the national level. Subnational
geospatial analyses have been operationalizing state capacity using the distance from the cap-
ital, the type of terrain (e.g. mountainous or forested) and the density of road networks
(Buhaug, 2010; Cederman et al., 2009). We believe that these indicators are problematic in
two main respects.
First, they try to capture state capacity in general terms and subsume various elements of
state capacity within single indicators. State capacity, however, is a multidimensional con-
cept. It encompasses various functional areas such as the security sector, provision of welfare
services and avenues for meaningful political participation (Boulding, 1989; Czempiel, 1981;
Milliken and Krause, 2002; Schwarz, 2005). Moreover, on the level of resources that deter-
mine state capacity, one may differentiate between finances, personnel and infrastructure.
Most of the indicators presented above neglect this multidimensionality. Empirical results
obtained with these indicators do not allow for inferences about the relevance of specific
elements of state capacity and thus prevent more specified theory-building.
Second, even if we assume that these indicators actually proxy state capacity in general
terms, it is not clear if they do not proxy other factors as well. The problem can exemplified
with respect to road networks: in addition to state capacity (Cederman et al., 2009), they
might be used as indicators for overall levels of development (Buhaug and Rød, 2006); they
may be understood as strategic targets of rebel groups (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009) and might
enhance rebel logistical capacities (Zhukov, 2012). If dense road networks are found to be
negatively or positively associated with political violence, what conclusions can be drawn
from these findings? Such ambiguities limit the explanatory power of analyses that rely on
these indicators.
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Theoretical argument on the subnational level
Finally, subnational analyses have been built on theoretical arguments that have been devel-
oped for cross-country studies. The respective hypotheses may, however, not be valid when
it comes to the role of state capacity at the subnational level. Previous literature has empha-
sized the theoretical assumptions sketched above: the more the state is able to coerce or to
co-opt, the less likely is the occurrence of violent protest, armed conflicts or civil wars. Such
a linear relationship is persuasive on the national level. However, further qualification is
needed if we look at the role of state capacity for geographical variation of violence within
states, especially for weak or least developed states. The main difference lies in the degree of
conceivable state weakness. Contrary to the national level, the state may not only be weak
in subnational regions but it may be virtually absent. This may yield consequences for effects
of particularly low levels of state capacity. First, on the national level extremely weak states
provide opportunities for rebellion but they are generally still strong enough to engage their
challengers in violent fights. However, if the state is actually absent in a specific subnational
region this may not be the case anymore. Second, from a cross-country perspective it may
be argued that grievances stemming from specific state regulations and allocations may trig-
ger resistance in weak states. However, this may not apply to subnational regions without
meaningful state presence, where people’s expectations towards the state are practically non-
existent and where its actions do not impact people’s daily lives. Finally, even in extremely
weak states it may make sense for rational actors to fight over access to state resources.
However, if the state is barely present in a specific subnational region, motives for trying to
capture state resources by violent means may be similarly absent. These differences affect
associations between state capacity and political violence and need to be taken into consider-
ation in respective subnational analyses.
Analyzing the role of the state’s manpower on the subnational level
Our analysis tries to avoid some of the challenges sketched above. To mitigate problems that
might emanate from the ecological fallacy we will perform analyses on the subnational level.
More specifically, we analyse associations between state capacity and political violence
across subnational administrative units. By focusing on the smallest administrative units
with meaningful state institutions, we considerably reduce challenges for inference that may
result from within-unit variance of the dependent and independent variables. Moreover,
contrary to national-level analyses, this approach allows us to measure state capacity where
it matters for public perceptions of the state and interactions with state institutions and
actors: on the local level. This reduces risks of potential distortions stemming from the gap
between macro-level indicators and micro-level dynamics.
Moreover, we focus on a specific element of state capacity, namely its manpower. The
state as an organization is crucially dependent on human agents. State employees administer
laws and regulations, implement redistributive schemes and public goods delivery, and
uphold the monopoly of violence. A state without bureaucrats is hardly anything more than
a set of unenforced decrees.3
To the best of our knowledge we are the first to proxy subnational variation in state
capacity with personnel records across various relevant functional areas. Specifically, we use
data on total state employee counts, employees in the security sector and employees in pub-
lic services provision in South Sudanese counties (more details below). We argue that this
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data on personnel is a valid indicator of a specific element of the state’s capacities. Thus, the
indicator is much less ambiguous.4 Contrary to data on road networks or distance to state
capitals, information on personnel can reasonably be associated with a specific dimension of
the state: its manpower in various functional areas. Our data do not reveal any information
on the quality of state personnel,5 their infrastructural or budgetary support. Despite these
limitations, we argue that assessing the effects of governmental manpower at the subnational
level promises to provide new and relevant insights about the determinants of political
violence.
Finally, reflecting some of the criticism raised above and contrary to hypotheses of previ-
ous studies, we argue that the relationship between state capacity and political violence fol-
lows an inverted-U shape on the subnational level. In many developing countries the state is
virtually absent in some regions. We expect these areas to be less violence-prone than regions
with intermediate levels of state capacity for three main reasons. First, and quite simply, the
state does not fight where it is not present—it will not be targeted by non-state challengers
and it cannot itself attack its rivals. Previous subnational studies have demonstrated that vio-
lence levels will be highest where territories are contested (Balcells, 2011; Kalyvas and
Kocher, 2009). Areas with particularly low levels of state capacity may be refuges for violent
actors rather than arenas for violent clashes. Second, low state presence is also associated
with especially low values of state resources. In plural societies, conflict often erupts over
access to public goods. Notably, different identity groups may try to maximize access to
basic service provision or to control public security resources in order to prevail over their
rivals. The less the state is present, the lower the value of the resources it has to offer is and
the less competition there is about these resources. Moreover, potential inter-communal or
inter-ethnic clashes might be effectively mediated by informal institutions in the complete
absence of state power (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Taylor, 1982). Finally, the lower the expec-
tations of the people towards the state, the lower the risk is that grievances are generated
owing to inadequate provision of public goods.
We expect intermediate levels of state capacity to be associated with comparatively high
levels of political violence. The underlying argument corresponds to the hypotheses put for-
ward in cross-country analyses: the state is present and trying to establish authority but not
able to co-opt or to repress effectively. State institutions provide collective goods, but not to
the extent needed or demanded. Insufficient supply may be particularly risky: the state raises
expectations that it does not fulfil, thus fomenting grievances that can evolve into violent
anti-state action. The state’s security apparatus engages challengers against its authority
within the respective subnational region, without however, being able to supress them effec-
tively, increasing the likelihood that violent events will be observed within the region.
Intermediate state capacity might also be associated with inter-communal or inter-ethnic
violence because imperfect state intervention and security institutions are mismatched with
informal institutions (Tajima, 2013). As compared with situations of particularly low state
capacity, access to state resources is more valuable but still scarce. This combination
increases the risk that groups engage in competition over access to these resources, poten-
tially leading to increased levels of political violence. Medium-level state presence might also
exacerbate inter-ethnic rivalries. When limited state personnel is largely recruited from a sin-
gle ethnic group, local populations might opt for violent resistance against a state that is try-
ing to assert its authority, but is being perceived as ethnically biased.
Finally, subnational regions with high state capacity should see less violence than other
regions. Effective provision of services reduces grievances among the population and
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decreases competition over access to these resources. Thus, risks of violence against the state
as well as among various competing groups should be lower. Conflict may still evolve within
these regions. Moreover, violence may diffuse from neighbouring areas. However, the state’s
police and military presence is strong enough to repress violent opposition against its
authority or to push it back into areas where the state’s capabilities are lower. Finally, the
state’s ability to enforce its monopoly over the use of force should also reduce the likelihood
of violence among non-state actors within the respective region. We will test the hypothesis
of this inverted-U relationship looking at the distribution of state personnel and violent
events in southern Sudan.
The case of southern Sudan, 2006–2010
Southern Sudan in the 2006–2010 time period is a suitable example to test our argument
about the non-linear relationship between state manpower and local violence. It provides an
empirical context of a developing country in which levels of state capacity vary dramatically
between administrative units and state institutions are in the process of institutionalizing a
monopoly of violence across the whole territory. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) between the government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/
Movement (SPLA/M) made an end to the protracted Sudanese civil war. A power- and
wealth-sharing arrangement was agreed at the national level. Moreover, the southern region
was granted a semi-autonomous status with wide-ranging self-government provisions—
including full responsibility over the armed forces and civil administration (e.g. Collins,
2008; Deng, 2005; Young, 2005).
Violence in southern Sudan
Throughout the period under investigation southern Sudan was haunted by various forms
of violence. Clashes along tribal lines were particularly widespread in Jonglei and Upper
Nile states but occurred across most parts of southern Sudan. Violence evolved from compe-
tition over resources such as land, food and cattle, mutual fears of tribal domination and
opposing claims on access to political and material resources of local administrative units
(Schomerus and Allen, 2010; Walraet, 2008). It is not possible to define a single inter-tribal
cleavage. Violent conflicts were not confined to specific tribal constellations—Mundari
fought Dinka, Bari fought Mundari, Lou Nuer clashed with Murle (McEvoy and LeBrun,
2010; Schomerus, 2008). During the interim period this kind of fighting along tribal lines
constituted the primary cause of violence across most parts of southern Sudan.
Certainly, not in all cases did violence take place in between different tribes. Time and
again violence erupted in various parts of the region owing to local power struggles of politi-
cal elites involving their quasi-private armies. In many cases they were intertwined with more
macro-level political dynamics such as the competition for political leadership of the Nuer
tribe (ICG, 2009). Sometimes security forces have been involved in fighting—not necessarily
as security agents of the state but also as tools of powerful political elites. After the end of
the civil war, numerous militia leaders were integrated into the SPLA and the government of
southern Sudan. Whereas their integration has helped to buy in numerous military comman-
ders into the official state structures, competition for status, political influence and economic
benefits has continued and on numerous occasions led to violent incidents (ICG, 2011b;
McEvoy and LeBrun, 2010).
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Finally, facing increasing military pressure from the Ugandan army, the notorious Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) moved into southern Sudan, where it terrorized communities in the
greater Equatorian states bordering Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(McEvoy and LeBrun, 2010). The rebels established their main base in Acholi-speaking
areas in Magwi county and the Imatong Hills during the later period of the Sudanese civil
war (Schomerus, 2008). As the war ended, the LRA lost much of its previous support from
the regime in Khartoum. In the following years, various attempts at peaceful talks with the
LRA failed. The number of violent incidents increased in southern parts of the greater
Equatoria region. In the interim period, clashes between the SPLA and the LRA, violence
against civilians committed by LRA members and fighting between the LRA and local self-
defense militias accounted for most of the violence in these southern regions (McEvoy and
LeBrun, 2010; Schomerus, 2008).
The state in southern Sudan
The southern Sudanese state institutions were strongly shaped by the civil war period. The
post-war public service emerged out of two distinct organizations: the first was the Civil
Authority of the New Sudan. In the early 1990s the SPLA/M felt the pressure to address
broader governance issues in addition to purely military concerns. It established the Civil
Authority of the New Sudan as the basic civil authority in SPLA/M-controlled areas
(Branch and Mampilly, 2005). The Coordinating Council of Southern States was the back-
bone of a Khartoum-controlled administrative structure confined to some towns under
northern Sudanese control (e.g. Collins, 2008; Johnson, 2003). After the end of the war, both
administrative systems were merged. Coordinating Council of Southern States staff were
fully integrated into the new southern administration, resulting in an oversized patchwork
structure. Whereas the public service further grew in size and some administrative reforms
were implemented, this basic setup remained largely the same throughout the period under
investigation (World Bank, 2010).
The end of the civil war and the establishment of the semi-autonomous region in southern
Sudan raised the population’s expectations with regard to rapid improvements of their living
conditions. The government has struggled to establish meaningful state presence across its
territory and to deliver on people’s expectations—not least from a stability perspective in
order to prevent the ‘‘burst of the expectations bubble’’ (ICG, 2011a: 18). In many areas the
civil administration has largely remained absent. Delivery of basic services has been low.
Education and health services, for instance, have been mostly confined to larger villages and
state capitals. The government of southern Sudan lacked the personnel, infrastructure and
financial resources to ensure service delivery in most rural areas.
The armed forces struggled with similar challenges. The SPLA included many fighters
from various former enemy militias that were integrated into the armed forces in 2006 and
beyond. All through the interim period the army maintained its heterogeneous character,
lacking effective central control and organization. It is ill-equipped, reducing its effectiveness
and its mobility. Moreover, it has been perceived in many regions as the agent of powerful
political interests. Nonetheless it has remained the central provider of security in southern
Sudan (ICG, 2009; McEvoy and LeBrun, 2010). The police force consists mainly of former
SPLA soldiers, often behaving more like soldiers than police officers (Schomerus and Allen,
2010). In the interim period many areas did not have any police posts. Lack of
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communication infrastructure and vehicles prevented the police from ensuring the safety of
the population beyond the boundaries of major towns (ICG, 2009).
Whereas the state was overall very weak in the interim period, it nonetheless tried to proj-
ect its authority across the southern Sudanese territory. Notably, civil administration and
security forces claimed functions held by local traditional elites while the state was absent. In
many areas such local authorities had been capable of maintaining a certain degree of order
where government institutions had not been present or effective (Schomerus and Allen,
2010). The expanding state, however, forced them into cooperation, undermining their cred-
ibility and acceptance within their communities (Ho¨hne, 2008). Considering the weakness of
the state in many parts of the country, its expansion may have actually led to a decline rather
than an increase in effective governance.
Having briefly introduced the context of the state and political violence in the period of
interest we will now move on to the statistical analysis of violence in southern Sudanese
counties.
Design, data and results
Data and operationalization for the dependent and independent variables
We analyse associations between state capacity and political violence on the subnational
level. Contrary to most other studies, we do not concentrate on violence in actual armed
conflicts or civil wars. As explained above, southern Sudan has experienced various forms of
violence, including clashes between state and non-state actors, inter-communal fighting and
violence against civilians. None of these different forms of violence qualifies for categoriza-
tion as armed conflict or civil war in line with the widely applied definition by the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO; Gleditsch et al., 2002).
Whereas we consider various manifestations of violence, we assume that state capacity mat-
ters for their occurrence and intensity in similar ways, in line with the hypothesis put forward
above.
We use data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) project
(Raleigh et al., 2010). The dataset contains geo-referenced violent event data for numerous
countries on the African continent and beyond. ACLED data has been criticized for geocod-
ing problems, notably miscoding owing to lack of differentiation of villages with similar
names and misuse of geo-precision codes that indicate whether information provided refers
to the exact location or broader geographic areas (Eck, 2012). To mitigate these issues, we
implement two complementary approaches. First, based on locations named in the ACLED
data, we match violent events to the counties of southern Sudan. Second, we use latitudes
and longitudes provided by ACLED to match events to counties.6 Both approaches produce
event counts that are highly, but not perfectly, correlated. For our main analysis we rely on
events matched to locations based on names instead of geo-codes, but we repeat all our anal-
yses using the alternative data, with no effect on our substantive results. Our main dependent
variable throughout the analysis is a simple total count of violent events in each southern
Sudanese county.
Our independent variable is state capacity, as expressed through manpower. We use infor-
mation on the number of serving public personnel per capita for each county as our main
measure. After the end of the Sudanese civil war in 2005, the Government of southern Sudan
initiated an administrative census with the aim of enumerating and appraising the human
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resources available in the public sector of the semi-autonomous region. The exercise received
support from the World Bank and was implemented by a team of international consultants
(Computer Feeds Ltd and Ecotech Consultants). A total of 62,1727 survey forms where filled
in between December 2005 and January 2006. Data was processed, cleaned and analyzed by
the implementing consultants. The final report, including technical descriptions and detailed
results, can be downloaded from the website of the World Bank.8
We used numbers on serving public service personnel per county provided in the annex of
the report.9 In order to match information from the report with data from other sources, we
had to adjust some of the data. Administrative divisions in southern Sudan were amended
shortly after the end of the civil war. Some counties were merged while others were newly
established. Moreover, some names provided in the list did not refer to actual counties in
southern Sudan. To provide a reliable list of counties that allowed for integration with infor-
mation generated after 2006 (see list of variables below), we used the county list from the
2008 national Sudanese census as the central reference. The 2006 report contains informa-
tion on 120 counties, whereas the 2008 census lists only 84. Most of the county names that
constitute the difference refer to former counties or to single towns. We researched which of
the counties were merged and the boundaries within which they lay in 2008 and attributed
the numbers respectively. Finally, we excluded all counties from the list that could not be
attributed to any county in the 2008 list.10
The personnel list contains functional categories such as agriculture, wildlife, education,
healthcare, finance, local government, technical and security.11 To measure state manpower
we used three alternative measures. First, we used total personnel numbers across all
categories, normalized by local population size. We then focused on the two distinct aspects
of state capacity: security and services provision. To measure the ability to sustain the
monopoly of violence, we created an indicator that counts only personnel in the security
and wildlife categories per county-population. We added employees of the wildlife depart-
ment since rangers in southern Sudan are armed. They are mostly former SPLA soldiers and
should be associated with armed forces rather than with administrative staff. We calculated
security personnel per capita and per county size, since the provision of security has an
important territorial dimension. To measure state manpower in services provision, we
counted personnel in the education and healthcare sectors, the two largest government ser-
vices categories, again normalized by the size of the local population.
The maps in Figure 1 indicate that the highest levels of violence occurred in the southern-
most counties, which are also characterized by intermediate to high levels of state capacity.
At the same time, other regions with low levels of state capacity, such as the southeast, are
also regions with the lowest numbers of violent events in the 2006–2010 period.
When we look at the bivariate correlations between our personnel based indicators of
state capacity and other prior used variables, we find hardly any association. Average GDP
per capita in southern Sudanese counties is negatively correlated with our measures of state
capacity, at fairly low levels. Capital distance shows barely any correlation with state capac-
ity either. Difficult terrain and estimates of average travel times to the next largest city show
a moderate amount of correlation with our three state capacity measures, but in the case of
forested terrain, not in the theoretically expected direction. Estimates of road density show
the strongest degree of association with state capacity, between 0.225 and 0.263 (while still
being likely to exert independent effects on political violence). Hence, our focus on state
manpower and the associated data from southern Sudanese counties clearly provides infor-
mation on a different aspect of state capacity that has not been sufficiently captured with
10 Conflict Management and Peace Science
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existing measures. The low strength of correlation between our manpower-based indicator
and other variables does not necessarily suggest that other studies have relied on invalid
measures, but rather that prior results represent at a minimum a wholly different dimension
of state capacity than is analyzed in this paper.
Alternative explanations and control variables
We include further socio-economic variables into our analysis to control for alternative
explanations of the location and intensity of violence. As we are not able to control for all
Figure 1. Violence and state capacity in southern Sudan, 2006–2010.
Table 1. Correlation matrix for state capacity indicators
State capacity State capacity (security) State capacity (services)
Average GDP per capita 20.062 20.004 20.047
Forest 0.151 0.063 0.175
Travel time 20.110 20.143 20.042
Road density 0.263 0.232 0.225
Capital distance 20.007 0.067 20.016
State capacity 1.000 0.739 0.855
State capacity (security) 0.739 1.000 0.301
State capacity (services) 0.855 0.301 1.000
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potentially competing factors, we focus on variables that might act as potential confounding
factors and that may play an important role in the specific context of southern Sudan in the
period under investigation.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the interim period between 2006 and 2010 after the civil
war between northern and southern Sudan and before South Sudan became an independent
country. Country-level analyses have demonstrated that post-war countries face significantly
higher risks of relapse into violence than other countries (Collier et al., 2008; Walter, 2004).
This argument may also apply to subnational regions. Thus, those counties that experienced
intense violence during Sudan’s civil war may display specific socio-economic characteristics
that increase the risk of violence in the post-war period. Furthermore, past levels of violence
might have impacted levels of state capacity in 2005/2006. Hence, we include a count variable
of violent events in the pre-2006 period.
It can be argued that violence will be more to likely occur in regions that are strongly
populated (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). The underlying argument is straightforward: the
more people live within a given administrative unit, the more people can be mobilized (e.g.
Raleigh and Hegre, 2009). Information on population counts has been taken from the 2008
census. While using a measure of population counts collected in the beginning years of our
period of analysis is not ideal, the census data are the only available and reliable population
estimate at the county level. For our regression analysis we log-transform local population
counts.
We also control for the distance to the border for each county. Border distance has been
identified as a relevant predictor of violent conflict (Buhaug and Rød, 2006). Distance from
an international border might also correlate with the reach of the state. Moreover, in the
case of southern Sudan, border distance may influence susceptibility towards violence incited
by the Government of Sudan through local proxy militias as well as by transnational actors
such as the LRA. To calculate border distance, we drew on the newly available PRIO-GRID
data structure (Tollefsen et al., 2012). The PRIO-GRID provides geo-referenced data on a
number of important variables at a 55 3 55 km grid level. We matched grid cells associated
with each county and calculated the average for each variable. This gave us, in the case of
border distance, the average distance to the next border for each grid cell included in the
county.
Previous studies have put forward the argument that areas that are difficult to access pro-
vide opportunities for rebel groups to hide from strong state armies (Collier and Hoeffler,
2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The most often emphasized aspects of terrain are mountains
and forests. To account for the effect of terrain accessibility on the location of violence, we
included measures for road density and terrain. For road density we counted the number of
major roads in each county, based on a shapefile provided by the United Nations
Development Programme. For difficult terrain we focused on forested areas, since mountai-
nous terrain is negligible in most parts of southern Sudan. Again, we used the PRIO-GRID
data to calculate the average share of forested terrain in all grid cells associated with a
county.
Various studies emphasize the role of low income and poverty for political violence
(Justino, 2009; Murshed and Gates, 2005; Østby, 2008), arguing that low living standards
lead to grievances and violence. Thus, violence may occur where people are particularly
poor and where overall development levels are low (Buhaug et al., 2011). To control for this
competing explanation we included a measure of GDP per capita, aggregated to the county
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level from PRIO-GRID data. Originally, this data was based on local GDP estimates from
Nordhaus (2006).
It has been argued that differences among identity groups might lead to competition and
conflict over political or economic resources (Bodea and Elbadawi, 2007; DiPasquale and
Glaeser, 1998; Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Similarly,
broken down to the subnational level, it has been argued that violence of any kind will be
more likely in areas that display specific identity constellations such as polarization or
fractionalization (Østby et al., 2011). As argued above, ethnicity has played a crucial role
in violence in southern Sudan—much of the violence in the interim period has taken place
along tribal lines. Based on maps of settlement patterns of Sudanese ethnic groups, pro-
vided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, we
counted the number of ethnic groups in each county as a basic proxy for ethnic heteroge-
neity. Our measure is not ideal. The (relative) size of identity groups may influence inter-
ethnic relations. Similarly, specific inter-ethnic constellations may be particularly vio-
lence-prone. We are not aware, however, of any detailed survey of ethnic affiliations in
southern Sudan, disaggregated on the county level. Moreover, identification of specifi-
cally violence-prone ethnic constellations would not only be utterly complex, requiring
detailed historical analysis of all possible inter-ethnic relations, but would also probably
be futile. Inter-ethnic violence has erupted along very different ethnic constellations in
different counties of southern Sudan. Some of them may have been ‘‘expectable’’, consid-
ering previous inter-tribal conflicts; others, however, reflect cleavages that have not been
politically salient before but that result from more recent and more mundane political
and socio-economic developments and conflicts (Schomerus, 2008; Schomerus and Allen,
2010). The latter constellations would be missed by any variable aiming at capturing ‘‘vio-
lence-prone’’ ethnic constellations. We therefore relied on a parsimonious diversity mea-
sure, acknowledging the limits of this approach.
Much attention has also been given to the role of resources for violent conflict (Basedau
and Lay, 2009; De Luca et al., 2012; Lujala, 2009). It can be argued that violence will most
likely be observed in resource-rich areas because rebels try to capture these resources to
finance their rebellion or because state-sponsored extraction of resources can generate grie-
vances among people living in resource-rich areas. We included a simple dummy variable on
the presence of oil or gas deposits in each county, based on the geocoded PETRO-DATA
provided by Lujala et al. (2007).
Finally, one might also be concerned about the potential confounding effects of non-
governmental organization (NGO) activity. NGOs play an important role in service provi-
sion in southern Sudan and might act as a substitute for state capacity (Bennett et al., 2010).
Although the theoretical impact of NGO activity on the relationship between state capacity
and violence is somewhat unclear, non-state service provision might still act as a confound-
ing variable. We utilized a report on NGOs in southern Sudan that provides the number of
NGO programs unique to single counties (South Sudan NGO Forum, 2013). Although the
report is from 2013 and thus compiled after the time frame of the analysis, it is the best avail-
able data on NGO presence at the county level. We constructed a simple dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if a county is ranked in the top category of NGO activity.12 Given the
shortcomings of the indicator, we estimated all models with and without it. Results of the
latter models correspond to the ones presented below.
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Model specification and results
Our basic dependent variable is the number of conflict events in each county in the 2006–
2010 time period. Counts are usually modeled in the generalized linear modeling framework
to explicitly account for non-normality. Since the count of violent events is over-dispersed,
that is, the variance is larger than the mean, we used standard negative binomial models.
An alternative dependent variable dichotomizes the counts of violent events based on a
threshold of five events. Doing so sacrifices some of the information in the underlying count,
but coarsening the variable might address some concerns of measurement bias.13 For this
binary measure we estimated a standard logit model. We always clustered standard errors at
the state level to account for arbitrary serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Table 2 pre-
sents our first set of estimation results for overall state capacity.
Column 1 estimates the negative binomial model with our measure of overall state capac-
ity and its squared term, controlling for confounding factors. The linear term is statistically
significant below the 0.1% level and positive. The quadratic term is negative and also statisti-
cally significant below the 0.1% level. This provides clear evidence for our hypothesis that
there exists an inverted-U relationship between state capacity and violence. In column 2 we
Table 2. Violence in southern Sudan, state capacity
(1) (2) (3)
Negative binomial Negative binomial Logit
Pre-2006 violence 0.0113* 0.0200** 0.0562**
(0.00482) (0.00756) (0.0190)
log(Population) 0.747* 1.314* 5.694*
(0.337) (0.627) (2.243)
Border distance 20.00317 20.00179 20.0187
(0.00260) (0.00344) (0.0157)
Road density 357.2 190.2 51.75
(363.4) (258.2) (876.2)
Forest 20.00747 20.0237 0.00322
(0.0125) (0.0184) (0.0546)
GDP per capita 20.00677 20.00672 20.0257
(0.00489) (0.00551) (0.0217)
NGO activity 0.932+ 0.646 —
(0.543) (0.481) —
Number of ethnic groups 0.00724 20.0343 0.211
(0.123) (0.0756) (0.293)
Oil 0.390 20.263 7.064*
(0.383) (0.606) (3.020)
State capacity 110.1*** 58.37 1917.8***
(31.75) (55.35) (482.6)
State capacity squared 21812.5*** 2742.5 268160.1***
(425.1) (1270.0) (17600.8)
Constant 22.034 28.280 254.24*
(6.061) (5.748) (21.17)
State dummies No Yes No
Observations 72 72 69
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p\0:10, *p\0:05, **p\0:01, ***p\0:001.
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add a full set of state-level dummy variables. Including such state ‘‘fixed effects’’ allows us to
control for any unobserved factors constant across counties within the same state.14 Note
that this asks a lot of our limited dataset of 72 observations, since additional parameters have
to be estimated. Column 2 shows that the linear and quadratic state capacity terms still have
the correct signs, but lose statistical significance. This might be because important variation
in our data comes from differences between counties of different states. Importantly, when
the model only includes the state capacity measure, its square and the state dummies, we can
recover a highly statistically significant inverted U effect. When using our binary measure of
violence (column 3) to estimate the effect of state capacity on the conditional probability of
experiencing more than five events, we also find a highly statistically significant inverted U-
shaped effect.
Of the controls we find that population size and prior violence play a consistently statisti-
cally significant and expected role. For all of the other control variables we mostly find no
robust statistically significant effects. The NGO activity measure is dropped in the logit esti-
mations, because high levels of NGO presence overlap perfectly with the binary conflict mea-
sure, that is, NGO focus on conflict affected regions. Interestingly, after controlling for our
measure of state capacity, GDP per capita has no clear effect on violence. In total, for gen-
eral levels of state capacity we find tentative evidence in support of our hypothesis.
Since we are working with generalized linear models, we cannot simply judge the substan-
tive importance of state capacity from the coefficients in Table 2. Instead we simulate the
expected number of events as state capacity varies from the sample minimum to the maxi-
mum, holding all other factors at their respective means, medians or modes (King et al.,
2000). Figure 2 shows the average effect and the associated 95% confidence intervals.
We can clearly see the shape of an inverted U, as suggested by the signs of the coefficients
in Table 2. At low levels of state capacity, the expected number of violent event counts in a
county is around one to two. As the level of state capacity increases, the average number of
event counts rises dramatically to peak values around five to six events. At even higher val-
ues of state capacity though, expected event counts start to fall again back to initial levels of
around one to two. This clearly shows the substantive importance of state capacity: at inter-
mediate levels of state capacity, violent events are approximately three times as frequent as
at low or very high levels.
Our results are particular pronounced for the initial effects of state capacity. These find-
ings provide strong evidence against the linear negative association between state capacity
Figure 2. Effect of state capacity on the expected number of violent events and 95% confidence intervals.
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and political violence emphasized in cross-country studies. Moreover, the results suggest that
the initial establishment of state authority has been a rather conflictive and potentially vio-
lent process in the case of southern Sudan. Findings are somewhat weaker for the right-hand
half of the inverted U. This is probably due to the lower number of counties that score at the
higher levels of state capacity, making precise estimates difficult. To investigate this further
we show in Figure 3 a simple scatterplot of county-level state capacity and the logged num-
ber of conflict events. We also fit a quadratic function to the data. We can see that, even in
the bivariate context, at very low levels of state capacity there are fewer violent events. At
medium levels of state capacity we find counties with the highest levels of violence. At very
high levels of state capacity, violence is again limited. This graph shows though that there are
very few counties in the dataset that score highly on the state capacity measure. This illus-
trates the difficulty in precisely estimating the effect of the highest levels of state capacity on
violence, but further substantiates the conflict-increasing effects at low to medium levels of
state capacity.
Tables 3 and 4 unpack which subcomponent of state capacity is the main driver of this
relationship: security or services provision. Table 3 shows estimated coefficients and clus-
tered standard errors for our state capacity indicators that only count security personnel.
Models 1–3 show the effect of state security capacity normalized by population, while
models 4–6 normalize the measure by county size. Results are weaker for security personnel
per capita. Neither the standard negative binomial nor the model with additional state dum-
mies shows any effect of state capacity (although a model with just state dummies again
shows statistical significance). Only the logit model shows a statistically significant inverted
U-shaped effect. Results are much stronger for state security personnel, normalized by
county size. Here we find across all three models the correct signs. The linear term is statisti-
cally significant at the 10, 1 and 5% level, respectively. The quadratic term is statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level in all three models. Furthermore, a joint F-test indicates that we
can reject the null hypothesis of both terms being simultaneously zero.
The somewhat weaker findings, especially with regard to the measure normalized by pop-
ulation size, may be due to the inconsistent role of the security forces in the interim period:
qualitative accounts from southern Sudan stress that actions by the army have been strongly
influenced by local political and ethnic constellations. Whereas the SPLA has effectively
Figure 3. Bivariate relationship between state capacity and logged violent events, point size scaled by
county area.
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deterred and contained violence in some areas, it may have contributed to inciting violence
in others. Most notably, many small ‘‘private armies’’ persist within the SPLA. They are
loyal to former militia commanders that were integrated into the SPLA after the end of the
civil war. Whenever such leaders decided to engage in unilateral action against the state,
respective units were quickly mobilized against regular SPLA forces (ICG, 2011b; McEvoy
and LeBrun, 2010). Moreover, SPLA soldiers often intervened in communal conflicts on
behalf of their respective identity groups, contributing to escalation of violence (ICG, 2009).
Such variations in SPLA actions may explain the inconsistent results we find in our estima-
tions. Compare this with the results for state capacity in services provisions, presented in
Table 4.
For the ability to provide services we find clear evidence of an inverted U-shaped effect.
Both the negative binomial models without and with state dummies show the correct signs
and statistical significance for the linear and quadratic term. The logit model also estimates
a positive linear and negative quadratic terms, albeit at lower levels of statistical significance.
Looking at the rather desolate state of public service delivery in southern Sudan in the
interim period, it is rather surprising that the link between state capacity and violence is less
Table 4. Violence in southern Sudan, state capacity (services)
(1) (2) (3)
Negative binomial Negative binomial Logit
Pre-2006 violence 0.0150** 0.0224*** 0.0551**
(0.00476) (0.00582) (0.0189)
log(Population) 0.792* 1.412*** 2.600*
(0.326) (0.260) (1.269)
Border distance 20.00249 20.00185 20.00489
(0.00271) (0.00290) (0.00762)
Road density 348.3 192.3 22900.0+
(317.9) (201.6) (1640.5)
Forest 20.00735 20.0278* 0.000180
(0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0289)
GDP per capita 20.00773 20.00825+ 20.0155
(0.00555) (0.00464) (0.00980)
NGO activity 0.929+ 0.568* —
(0.528) (0.275) —
Number of ethnic groups 0.0316 20.0158 20.252
(0.131) (0.0606) (0.402)
Oil 0.250 20.243 2.342
(0.322) (0.374) (2.269)
State capacity (services) 181.1*** 154.1+ 1126.6+
(34.25) (80.43) (600.9)
State capacity (services) squared 26007.1*** 24857.1* 244514.3
(1095.7) (2455.9) (43764.3)
Constant 21.783 28.014+ 220.64
(6.469) (4.389) (17.05)
State dummies No Yes No
Observations 72 72 69
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
+p\0:10, *p\0:05, **p\0:01, ***p\0:001.
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strongly affected by the security dimension of the state and much more so by its ability to
provide services. Moreover, previous qualitative accounts emphasize poor quality of service
provision as well as low effectiveness of state institutions and international actors in providing
for an actual ‘‘peace dividend’’ in the aftermath of the civil war (e.g. Bennett et al., 2010). We
believe, however, that it would be misleading to consider objective indicators of actual service
delivery alone. Reports from South Sudan indicate that people’s perceptions of state action
are essential. Service delivery may be perceived as poor, deficient and therefore irrelevant
from the outside, but survey evidence suggests that people actually attach great value to it
and judge the state in terms of its efforts at providing services in an equitable way.
When asked for priorities with respect to ensuring security, expansion of health and edu-
cation services have been ranked among the top five priorities by communities across vari-
ous counties (e.g. UNDP et al., 2012a, b). In focus group discussions done for the National
Democratic Institute in 2011, people emphasized that the public delivery of basic services to
all southern Sudanese would ‘‘cure’’ many of the country’s problems. Most people asked
recommended that the government focus on improvements in basic services, with education
and health cited as top priorities (Cook and Moro, 2012). Interviews, focus group discus-
sions and questionnaire-based surveys undertaken by Schomerus and Allen (2010) stress
that the absence of development has encouraged violent behavior. Almost all people claimed
that better access to services would be essential for securing peace.
Our findings suggest that a low presence of service personnel was associated with low lev-
els of violence. We argue that people’s expectations are essential in this respect. Surveys indi-
cate that people’s frustrations are often based on a sense of feeling abandoned by the state
(UNDP et al., 2012a). However, such expectations would have certainly been particularly
low where the state has never been able to establish any meaningful presence. Similarly, sur-
veys stressed that a sense of unequal treatment in terms of service delivery incited tribal
competition—the background of many incidents of violence across southern Sudan.
However, where the state has been virtually absent in terms of service delivery, inequities
will generally be less pronounced. Moreover, the value of state capture was particularly low,
reducing the intensity of competition.
Competition was certainly more intense in areas with more substantial state presence and
service provision. Participants in the above-mentioned studies emphasized that unequal pro-
vision of services along tribal lines forced them to resort to tribalism themselves (National
Democratic Institute, 2012). Such dynamics have in many instances led to fierce competition
for access to government that eventually escalated into violent clashes. Moreover, the state’s
presence raises people’s expectations as regards the state’s provision of services that are
urgently needed. However, as the state is not strong enough to ensure delivery on a broad
range, unmet expectations may increase the risk of violent behavior in line with surveys cited
above.
Finally, as the number of state personnel increases, potentially beneficial effects of state
presence become more pronounced. High levels of personnel in service delivery certainly do
not mean abundance and broad-based coverage in the case of southern Sudan. Still, consid-
ering prioritization of service delivery by the population, we assume that higher numbers of
personnel can instill the perception that the state is trying to address the essential needs of
the population. Moreover, as the number of personnel increases, it will become less likely
that single identity groups are able to control all of the service provision, potentially easing
competition among tribes.
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In total, given the appropriate operationalization, the non-linear pattern suggested in the
simple maps presented in Figure 1 is borne out in the multivariate statistical analysis: even
after controlling for a comprehensive list of important confounding factors, as well as unob-
served effects at the state level, we still find good evidence for a non-linear effect of state
capacity on violence.
Further robustness checks
We implemented a series of additional robustness checks to further establish the strength of
the finding. In the following we simply summarize our auxiliary findings, while some of the
detailed results and regression tables are provided in the supplementary Online Appendix.15
First, we re-estimated our models for the personnel indicators using slightly different geo-
coded event counts based on longitude and latitude provided by ACLED (all and only high-
quality events). In both cases we again found strong confirmation for our finding.
It might also be of concern that the capital county of Juba registers the highest number of
conflict events and might drive our findings. We repeated our analysis dropping Juba county
and still found a clear, strongly statistically significant effect and non-linear effect of state
capacity.
Similarly, we also dropped counties with the maximum values of overall state capacity
and state capacity in services provision. The concern is that an outlying county with very
high levels of state capacity and unrelatedly low violence is driving the results. Dropping the
counties with maximum values and repeating the analysis we can still confirm all of our
results. Taken together, our statistical analysis provides overwhelming evidence of a more
nuanced theory of the relationship between state capacity and violence in the developing
world.
Conclusion
It is intuitively convincing that countries will tend to experience more violence when states
are not able to effectively secure their monopoly over the use of force or if they are not capa-
ble of providing essential public services to their citizens. A growing body of literature aims
at investigating this association empirically. These efforts have been severely hampered by
lack of data that would allow for persuasive operationalization of different facets of
state capacity. Moreover, the dominant cross-country approach blurs potential gaps in
between national-level planning and actual capacity and does not allow for consideration of
subnational variations of state capacity. On the other hand, subnational analyses have not
adequately considered potential differences between the national and subnational levels for
the generation of hypotheses that link state capacity to political violence.
Our analysis overcomes some of these challenges. Focusing on the subnational rather than
the national level, we mitigate challenges emanating from ecological inference. Second, our
analysis relies on data on the geographical distribution of personnel that is more readily asso-
ciated with varying degrees of the manpower dimension of state capacity across subnational
regions. Finally, we propose a theoretical argument that accounts for the specificities of the
subnational level of analysis as compared with the cross-country approach.
We have said a great deal about the shortcomings of previous studies. We are, however,
also very much aware of the problems that come with our own analysis. First, our estima-
tions are time-invariant and do not differentiate strongly between different types of violence.
20 Conflict Management and Peace Science
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on April 21, 2015cmp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Such aggregation covers temporal changes and potentially diverging dynamics of different
types of violence such as inter-communal clashes or anti-state riots. Second, the number of
personnel provides for a persuasive but not a flawless operationalization of the state capac-
ity: certainly qualification and budget as well as material equipment and infrastructure mat-
ter significantly for state capacity. Finally, as compared with cross-country studies, the scope
of our findings is rather limited. We have concentrated on a single case study that can be con-
sidered special in various respects—the type of violence, the specific post-war administrative
structure and the generally low overall capacity of state institutions in southern Sudan.
Thus, whereas we cannot claim that our findings can be directly transferred to other cases,
we are convinced that our results yield important insights for research on the role of state
capacity for political violence. Most notably, we find a robust non-linear association. While
we find supportive evidence for the pacifying effects of state capacity, this only applies when
the state extends its power from intermediate to high levels. Contrary to previous studies,
our analysis suggests that state penetration may increase rather than reduce the risk of vio-
lence if it is not strong enough to deter or co-opt potential opposition. This finding resonates
with historical work on the emergence of the state in Western Europe and its partial absence
in Africa (Herbst, 2000; Tilly, 1992): building state capacity is a bloody and arduous con-
quest, which might only pay peace dividends in the long run. This qualified understanding of
the role of state capacity for political violence carries important implications for current
debates on state failure and post-war reconstruction.
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Notes
1. We use ‘‘Political violence’’ as an umbrella term for various forms of collective violence such as
anti-state riots, communal violence and clashes between organized non-state actors and the state
(Gurr and Bishop, 1976).
2. Representation or legitimacy is often referred to as third relevant dimension of state capacity
(Milliken and Krause, 2002; Schwarz, 2005). In this sense capacity refers to the state’s ability to
provide for meaningful political participation, inclusion and peaceful reconcilement of differing
interests. Whereas we do not deny that such factors may matter for political violence, we do not
consider them in our analysis. First, these factors are more associated with regime type than state
capacity. Moreover, variation of representation is hard to capture in subnational analyses, where
all of the units of analysis are subject to the same national government system.
3. Previous studies have used numbers of personnel as indicator for state capacity (Bussmann, 2009;
de Rouen and Sobek, 2004; Walter, 2006). However, they consider military personnel only. Thus,
in terms of the role the state’s human resources, they have missed substantial elements of state
capacity.
4. While the relative size of local government personnel force might also be a measure of patronage
politics and clientelistic efforts, we believe that this still reflects essential human capital capacities
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that governments can rely on. Clientelistic networks and patronage hiring might be used for polit-
ical ends, but still represent one form of an effective delivery mechanism and organizational
strength.
5. Some of the recorded employees might be beneficiaries of patronage and not actually perform any
functions on behalf of the state.
6. We created one event count indicator that uses all events recorded by ACLED and one alternative
count that only uses events with high-quality geo-codes as indicated by ACLED.
7. As this was the first exercise of this kind in southern Sudan, the degree of non-response cannot be
estimated.
8. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSUDAN/Resources/Final_report_SS_JD.pdf
9. The report does not include counts of international staff.
10. For example, ‘‘GoSS’’, the acronym for ‘‘Government of Southern Sudan’’ or ‘‘Khartoum’’ the
capital of Sudan
11. We excluded the non-descript category ‘‘other’’.
12. Results are unaffected when we also include counties in the second highest category.
13. It might be the case that ACLED event counts under- or overestimate the exact number of events.
It is less likely though that a distinction between counties with high and low levels of violence is
subject to the same degree of measurement bias.
14. There exists no clear equivalent to standard ordinary least squares fixed effects models for count
data. Allison and Waterman (2002) show that fixed effects count models, as implemented by the
statistical software STATA, do in fact not control for time-invariant unobserved factors. They
instead recommend as a simple approximation the use of unit dummies. The incidental parameters
problem will also be less of a concern in our models, since we only include dummies at the state,
not the county, level.
15. Online Appendix is available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/l6qaoav0x49xexz/SUPPLEMENTARY
%20APPENDIX.pdf
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